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BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTIONS: A FULL CIRCLE
BACK TO THE ACT OF 1800?
I
TiH

GREAT SocmTY

The emergence of the individual consumer in American economic
society is largely attributable to the tremendous growth of consumer
credit. Heavy wallets bulging, not with the green scrip that daily grows
less familiar, but rather with plastic and metal wafers, are hallmarks
of a system that encourages acquisition of goods and services on the
"buy now, pay later" basis. As of the summer of 1967, over ninety-five
billion dollars worth of consumer credit was outstanding.' In such an
environment, it is inevitable that many individuals become overextended, and that a few, finding the burden of debt intolerable, are
forced to turn to society for relief. Bankruptcy has thus become increasingly significant in our credit-oriented society.2
The last comprehensive bankruptcy legislation was the Act of July
1, 1898, 3 which, as amended, remains in force today. The problem of
bankruptcy at that time was considerably less significant than it is today,
and Congress did not contemplate that the bulk of bankruptcy petidons would be filed by individuals voluntarily seeking relief.4 Nevertheless, the statute provided:
This Act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by the laws of the United States or by
the State laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition in the
State wherein they have had their domicile for the six months imI Address by Jack N. Eisendrath, Attorney, to the American Home Economics Ass'n
Nat'l Workshop of Consumer Credit in Family Financial Management, at Madison, Wisc.,
Oct. 10, 1967. [hereinafter cited as Eisendrath].
2 Personal bankruptcies climbed from 91 per 100,000 to 98 per 100,000 between fiscal
1966 and 1967. Research Serv. Div., Natl Consumer Fin. Ass'n, Report on 1967 Nonbusiness
Bankruptcies by States, table 11, at 4 (Oct. 12, 1967) [hereinafter cited as Research Serv.
Div.]. Most disturbing is that more voluntary bankrupts seek relief with less real reason
to go into bankruptcy. The indebtedness of bankrupts at the time of filing is actually
rather slight relative to their assets or income. G. BRUNNER, PERSONAL BAr'TUciEs: TRENDS

54-59 (1965).
3 Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
4 "Written before the era of consumer credit, the legislation was designed primarily
for the needs of commercial and industrial organizations." G. BRUNNER, supra note 2, at 8.
Since 1957, nonbusiness voluntary bankruptcies have increased from 63,601 to 191,709.
Research Serv. Div., supra note 2, table I, at 3. This accounts for over 90% of bankruptdes currently filed. See id.
AND CHARACrERISTIcs
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mediately preceding the filing of the petition, or for a longer portion of such six months than in any other State .... 5
All states provide such exemptions for the benefit of debtors. The
exemption statutes preclude creditors from attaching or executing upon
certain items of personal or real property of the debtor.
Although the Bankruptcy Act looks to state substantive law for
catalogues of exempted items, it contains its own procedure for claiming exemptions in bankruptcy proceedings. The petition in a voluntary
action must be accompanied by a statement of personal affairs, a schedule of liabilities, and a schedule of assets. 6 The bankrupt may include
with his schedule of assets a list of the property he claims as exemtpt, or
he may claim his exemptions at a later time, provided the delay is not
prejudicial to his creditors' rights.7 The bankruptcy court will set aside
the property claimed as exempt, and the title to nonexempt property
will vest in the trustee in bankruptcy, who is responsible for distributing the nonexempt assets to the bankrupt's creditors.8 Upon discharge,
the termination of bankruptcy proceedings, the bankrupt retains
full title and possession of the exempt property. 9
The story of the Medders provides a striking example of possible
results under a bankruptcy scheme that incorporates diverse state exemption laws. Ernest Medders was a seventy-five dollar a week mechanic's helper in Memphis, Tennessee. His wife helped meet living
expenses by working as a practical nurse. In 1961, the couple migrated
5 Bankruptcy Act § 6, 52 Stat. 847 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1964).
6 Bankruptcy Act § 7a(8), 11 U.S.C. § 25(a)(8) (1964). After compliance with these

procedures and the payment of a statutory fee, the court will adjudge the petitioner a
bankrupt. Adjudication is treated a4 an application for discharge in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act § 14i, 11 U.S.C. § 32(a) (1964).
7 Failure to file a timely claim for exemptions may be construed as a waiver of
exemption rights. Patton v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 246 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Pa.
1965); In te E.oark, 28 F. Supp. 515 (E.D. Ky. 1939); In re Brobks, 27 F.2d 146 (N.D. Tex.

1928).
11 U.S.c. § 75 (964).
9 Problems arise where there is a dispute concerning the status of the prdperty claimed
to be exempt. Theoretitaily the trustee never bbtains title to the exempt property.
See Hogan v. Hali, 118 F.2d 247 (5th Cir. 1941); In re Power, 115 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.
1940); in re Lippow, 92 F.2d 619 (7th Cit. 1937). But in the case of such a dispute,
he may take possession and assert title during the bahik-uptcy proceedings. Schrepel v.
Davis, 283 F. 29 (8th Cir. 1922). The true locus of title may be determined by a finding
of the bankruptcy court. Although disputes concerning state exemption statutes may be
litigated in state courts, expense and time factors generally favor settlement of the issue
in the bankruptty court itself. See Itirkpatrick Hardware Co. v. Rodgers, 35 Ga. App. 790,
134 SX. 806 (1926), which held that a decision of the bankruptcy court setting aside an
exemption was to be given the same effect a§ a Similar state court decision. Where the
adjudication is in the bankrupt's favor, his title is restored. See 1h tie Hausman, 209 F.
Supp. 219 (M.D. Ga. 1962).
8 Bankruptcy Act § 47,

1968]

BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTIONS

to Texas, where Ernest's claim of heirship to a 500 million dollar oil

fortune induced everml private loans. Confidence in his apparent prosperity snowballed, eventually producing an indebtedness of over three
million dollars. His failure to pay a relatively small feed store bill
finally resulted in bankruptcy proceedings in which creditors' claims
of over two million dollars were filed. As permitted by Texas law,10
the Medders claimed their rural homestead as exempt from the claims.
The "homestead" consisted of nearly 200 acres of land, a 250 thousand
dollar house, and a 175 thousand dollar "party barn," onetime scene
of gala affairs for Houston society. An auction of the nonexempt assets
yielded funds sufficient to pay only about one third of the claims."
Though it may safely be presumed that neither the Texas legislature
nor Congress intended such an exaggerated resut the present scheme
appears to justify the Medders' claim to their entire homestead.
The remainder of this Note seeks to analyze the current confusion
and inadequacy of the state exemption laws and to propose a rational
approach to the prqblem of bankruptcy exemptions. The proposed
approach mpst take account of differences in bankrupts: their peculiar
abilities to meet their obligations outside of bankruptcy and to obtain
relief within bankruptcy. Although each bankrupt may be unique,
reference will occasionally be made to a "typical" bankrupt, representing the vast majority of bankrupts for whom a statute must primarily be designed.
II

THE EXEMPTION STATUTES
Exemption statutes reflect a basically sound policy: to prevent
creditors in bankruptcy proceedings from. stripping the defaulting
debtor of all his property, thereby forcing him into penury and making
his dependents wards of the state. 12 But the states have experienced
difficulty in balancing creditor and debtor interests. The result is a
10 TExAs CONsT. art. 16, § 51.
' N.Y. Times, May 2,
1967, at 41, col, 3; N.Y. Times, May g6, 1967, at 2, col 1;
N.Y. Times, May 27, 1967, at 28, col. 2.
12 The United States Supreme Court declared:
It is the twofold purpose of the Bankruqptcy Act to convert the estate of the

bankrupt into cash and distributp it among creditors and then to giye the bankrupt a fresh start with such exemptions and rights as the statute left untouched.

Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913). It is a recognized purpose of exemption
statutes to provide a minimum security for the dependents of the debtor, First Nat'l Bank

v. Tiftfny, 40 Wash. 2d 193, 202, 442 P.2d 169, 173 (19 2).
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considerable lack of uniformity in the exemptions permitted by various
state laws. The antiquity of the exemption statutes and the widespread
failure to modernize them have exaggerated the lack of uniformity and
poignantly demonstrated that many of the exemption provisions have
little modern relevance.
A. A Call for Uniformity
The Bankruptcy Act of 184113 provided for voluntary bankruptcy
proceedings by individual debtors and included a federal exemption
for apparel, furniture, and other items of necessity up to a maximum
of three hundred dollars. 14 Increased prosperity and the popularity and
generosity of state exemption laws passed after the panic of 1837 led to
the Act's repeal, and any pro-bankruptcy sentiment was virtually
eliminated until after the 1857 panic, 15 when economic disruption
coupled with the Civil War brought about the Bankruptcy Act of
1867.16
Incorporation of state exemption laws in the Bankruptcy Act of
1841 was debated by Congress, but no provision was made to include
state exemptions.' 7 It was believed that, since Congress alone could
make laws on bankruptcy, inclusion of state law would destroy the
constitutionally required uniformity. 18 The issue had not been resolved
when the Act of 1867 included state exemptions as an accommodation
to the debtor-oriented western states,19 but the courts later upheld the
20
constitutionality of the inclusion provision.
13 Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440.
14 Id. § 3, 5 Stat. at 442.
IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNrTED STATES, 87-88, 95 (1935).
16 Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517. See generally C. WARmEN, supra note 15,
at 95-106.
17 C. WARREN, supranote 15, at 100.
18 The uniformity concept in bankruptcy finds its roots in the Federal Constitution,
which provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power ... To establish ... uniform Laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, ci. 4.
19 To satisfy western states' demands for the inclusion of their generous exemption
laws, C. WARREN, supra note 15, at 100, the act provided that the state laws were to apply
where their allowances were greater than the maximum federal exemption of $500.
Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 14, 14 Stat. 522.
20 E.g., Darling v. Berry, 13 F. 659 (C.C.D. Ia. 1882). The courts' attempts to find
uniformity, where none in fact existed, resulted in some tortuous semantics. One court
explained its reasoning in the following terms:
If congress saw cause to pass bankrupt laws under the grant of power referred
to, the injunction is that they shall be uniform throughout the United States ....
When viewed with reference to the state exemption laws, there is a uniformity
which, on reflection, readily suggests itself. Though the states vary in the extent
of their exemptions, yet what remains the bankrupt law distributes equally among
the creditors. Nor does the bankrupt law in any way vary or change the rights
15 C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY
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The present Bankruptcy Act retains the inclusion of state exemption laws, and dispenses with a federal exemption.21 When the law was
passed in 1898, the power of Congress to use state exemptions of property had been acknowledged by the courts. 22 The rationale for finding
uniformity was that the creditor extends credit with knowledge of the
exemption statute of his debtor's domiciliary state. Since his contract
with the debtor is subject to this implied restriction, it is not unfair
to the creditor that his remedy in case of the debtor's default is limited
and tempered by the exemption law. The rationale seems to lose much
of its force in light of the growth of national credit and the emergence
of a mobile society. When the 1898 Act was passed, credit was mostly
of local importance. The local creditor at that time was better able to
adjust his business to reflect increased risks under higher exemptions.
Today's nationwide corporate creditor may treat the risk of debtor
bankruptcy as a cost of doing interstate business, but it is impractical
to differentiate between debtors to account for local exemption variations.
The mobility of the population also invalidates the local creditor
assumption. Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act applies the exemption law
of the state in which the bankrupt has been domiciled for six months
prior to bankruptcy. When the bankrupt has moved within that sixmonth period, the law of the state in which the bankrupt was domiciled for the greater part of the six months preceding bankruptcy is
determinative. The arbitrary six month rule fails to guarantee that a
creditor will maintain his rights under the law of the state within which
he contracted with the debtor. A truly uniform exemption law would
eliminate the significance of the domiciliary requirement and would
clarify creditors' rights by allowing creditors to know that wherever
of the parties. All contracts are made with reference to existing laws, and no
creditor could recover more from his debtor under the state laws than the unexempted part of his assets, the very thing that is attained by the bankrupt law,
which, therefore, is strictly uniform.
In re Beckerford, 3 F. Cas. 26, 27 (No. 1209) (C.G.D. Mo. 1870). A later court considering
the identical question agreed with the earlier decision but used language that belies the
fragile logic there employed. "A bankrupt law.. . to be constitutional must be uniform.
Whatever rules it prescribes for one it must for all. It must be uniform in its operations,
not only within a state, but within and among all the states." In re Deckert, 7 F. Gas.
334, 335-36 (No. 3728) (C.C.E.D. Va. 1874) (emphasis added). To justify its result, the
court was forced to define "operations" as procedural rights only, not substantive rights
under the bankruptcy law. The Supreme Court upheld both cases and the constitutionality
of state exemption law inclusion in Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 189-90

(1902).
21 Bankruptcy Act § 6, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1964).
22 E.g., In re Beckerford, 3 F. Gas. 26 (No. 1209) (C.C.D. Mo. 1870); Dozier v. Wilson,
84 Ga. 801, 10 SX. 743 (1890). See also C. WARREN, supra note 15, at 144.
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the debtor goes, the debt will be Under no increased jeopardy because
of varying exemption laws. The modem meaning to be ascribed to
"uniformity" of exemptions should be uniformity of kind and amount
in all judicial districts
B. Geographic Variation
Local tradition and history are major factors responsible for the
present lack of uniformity among state exemption laws. The eastern
states tend to favor creditors by allowing only parsimonious exemptions. The western states, originally populated largely by immigrants
and agrarian refugee debtors from the East, typically provide larger,
more numerous exemptions; California and Texas offer the most generous exemptions. California recently increased the dollar limitation
on its homestead exemption from 12,500 dollars to 15,000 dollars.2 3
Texas, perhaps the most liberal, allows for either of two homesteads: a
rural ranch of no more than 200 acres, or an urban business homestead
valued at 5,000 dollars or less at the time of its declaration as a homem2 5 In
stead,24 but with no, limit on the value of the fixtures thereon.
sharp contrast is the Connecticut policy. When confronted with the
insufficiency of its statutory homestead exemption of one thousand
dollars, the Connecticut legislature met the problem by simply abolishing the exemption.2 6 Although the economies of the states have converged greatly since the last century, the spirit and often the letter of
the exemption laws formulated then are still influential, and cognizance is still given to policy decisions of bygone legislature&2
Specialized pressure groups have also been influential in the formulation of the exemption laws, and have aggravated further the problem
23 CAL. Civ. CODE ANN.

§ 1260 (West Supp. 1967), amending Stats. 1953, ch. 943,

p. 2319, § 1.

24 TEx. CONsT. art 16, § 51; TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 3832-83 (1966).
25 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8833 (1966).

26 Conn. Pub. Acts 1958, ch. 27, § 42. Connecticut thus joins Delaware, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia. See qA'L Ass'N oF CREwrr
MANAGEMENT, CRjDIT MVANtUAL OF COMMEnCIAL LAws 334-43 (1967). It is interesting to note
that Connecticut ranks second bnly to thb District of Columbia in average annual per
capita income. BuREAU OF THE CENsus, STATIicAL ABnsAcr OF THE UNITED STATES 327,
table 465 (1967).
27 Th1s is not to say, however, that updating the individual states' statutes would

solve the lack of uniformity problem. There is a basically generous attitude of many
western States toward exemption laws that has carried over to the present time and

contrasts With the generally tighter restrictions of the eastern states. If dollar limitations
were modernized, there would still probably be wide differences in what is regarded as
adequate or necessary. For instance, the present cost of a watch varies between ten
dollars and several hundred dollars. The question whether a particular watch is adequate
or necessary would be answdred differently in various locales. See genbrally Joslin, Debtors'
Exemption Laws: Time for Modernization, 34 IND. L.J. 355 (1959).
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of promoting uniformity, Exemptions maint ined by groups with continuing influence include the following; fishing boats and nets,2 $ unpaid milk proceeds, 9 oyster boats and rigging,30 trade tools, x and
professional libraries,3 2 Even where such groups have weakened or
disappeared, or the exemption has lost contemporary utility, the laws
35
34
33
remain on the books. Molasses mills, ferry boats, workers' bicycles,
and two tons of coal3 6 are examples of exempt items for which there is
virtually no current justification.
C. Value Obsolescence
Where a dollar limitation is placed on the value of the exempt
property, the shrinkage of the dollar and the failure periodicolly to
update the limitation has in many instances frustrated the legislative
intent to provide the debtor with a substantial exemption. South Caro,
lina retains its homestead exemption at the 1895 leyel of one thousand
dollars.3 7 By interpretation, courts have required partition of the homestead where its value has exceeded the dollar limit of a small exemption, even though partition defeats the statutory intent to provide a
minimal homestead for the debtor.88 Wage exemptions provide another
striking example of obsolescence resulting from legislative inattention.
Exemptions of twenty-five dollars a week in Indiana 9 and one hundred
dollars a month in Maryland,4 0 established in 1897 and 1874 respectively, do not amount to a living wage in 1968.
Continual inflation creates the need for frequent review of the
28 CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE §§ 690.8, 690.13 (West 1955).
29 N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 5205(g) (McKinney 1963).
30 CONN, GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-059 (1958).
31 See, e.g., id.; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.6023(5) (Rev. vol. Supp. 1965); Mo. ANN. STAT.

§ 513.435(7) (Supp. 1967); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW §§ 5205(a)(7), 5205(b)(4) (McKinney 1963).
32 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 690A (West Supp. 1967); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-2304(9) (1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37(8) (Supp. 1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513A35(7)
(Supp. 1967); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 5205(a)(7), 5205(b)(4) (McKinney 1963); R.I. GEN.
LAws ANN. § 9-26-4(2) (1956).
33 MISS. CODE ANN. § 507(o) (Supp. 1966).
34 TEX. R.v. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 9836 (1966).
35 CAL. Crv. PRO. CODE § 690A (West Supp. 1967).
36 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-352 (1958).
87 S.C. CONST. art. 3, § 28. A proper updating would increase South Carolina's dollar
limit to approximately $4,000, since $1.15 in 1967 has the same purchasing power as 34.5
cents had in 1913. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, supra note 26, at 349 table 498, at 955 table 504
(1967).
38 Norwood v. Watson, 242 F. 885 (4th Cir. 1917); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, § 10-12
(Smith-Hurd 1965); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4553 (1964); Micir. STAT. ANN.
§§ 27A.6027, 27A.6059 (Supp. 1965).
39 IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-505 (1946).

40 MD. ANN. CODE art. 9, § 31 (Supp. 1967), construed in Shriver v. Carlin & Fulton
Co., 155 Md. 51, 141 A. 434 (1928). See also MIcn. STAT. ANN. § 27A.7511 (1962).
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dollar limitations on exemptions. The states have not fulfilled that
need, and there is no evidence that they will do so in the future. Perhaps the failure to update the homestead exemption may be justified
by the increasing tendency of the urban dweller to rent his home,
thereby rendering the homestead allowance inappropriate. But legislatures have failed to substitute an exemption suitable for the apartment dweller.
D. Judicial Efforts to Modernize

The basic defect of the state exemption statutes is their reflection
of an agrarian, rather than an industrial, economy. Where state legislatures have defaulted in updating the types of and limitations on
exempted items, the courts have often attempted to redefine the exemptions to meet modem needs.41 Equivocal statutory language is
susceptible to such judicial manipulation. Thus, courts have substituted
motor vehicles for "carriages and wagons," 42 and tractors or trucks for
"tools of the trade" or "beasts of burden." 43 But some language, such
as stated cash amounts, 4 4 cannot be recast. Courts have also faced in-

terpretive problems in determining the status of contemporary items
such as pianos, radios, phonographs, and televisions. Though they have
developed no consistent pattern of treatment, the courts are understandably wary of classifying expensive luxuries as necessities subject
to exemption. 45 Thus, outdated exemption laws will often force courts
into the unfortunate position of being able to do equity, if at all, only
through a tortured statutory construction.
To be sure, the language of the statute is directed to the more primitive
agrarian economy of 1868, but the Kansas court has insisted that . . . manifest
intent be given contemporary effect through the technique of "liberal construction."
Cantrell v. Molz-Frick Implement Co., 278 F.2d 546, 547 (1oth Cir. 1960). But see Michaelson
v. Elliot, 209 F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1954) (a television set is neither an article of furniture nor a
musical instrument for exemption purposes).
42 E.g., Phillips v. Palomo & Sons, 270 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1959); Peyton v. Farmers'
Nat'l Bank, 261 F. 326 (5th Cir. 1919); Patten v. Sturgeon, 214 F. 65 (8th Cir. 1914); In re
Thompson, 103 F. Supp. 942 (S.D. Tex. 1952). But see In re McEuen, 19 F. Supp. 924 (W.D.
Ky. 1937) ("wagon" literally construed).
43 E.g., In re Pioch, 235 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1956); Gunn v. Credit Serv. Corp., 46 So. 2d
628 (La. Ct. App. 1950); Pellish Bros. v. Cooper, 47 Wyo. 480, 38 P.2d 607 (1934). But see
Law v. Simon, 110 Colo. 545, 186 P.2d 520 (1943) (semble) (businessman's automobile not
exempted).
44 See, e.g., In re Coller, 111 F. 503 (D. Mass. 1901).
45 Compare Goldsmith v. M. Jackman & Sons, Inc., 327 F.2d 184 (10th Cir. 1964),
Sellers v. Bell, 94 F. 801, 812 (5th Cir. 1899), and In re Richards, 64 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.
Tex. 1946), with In re Everleth, 129 F. 620 (D. Vt. 1904), and Towns v. Pratt, 33 N.H. 345
(1856).
41
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III
THE FRA EWORK OF AN UPDATED EXEMPTION POLICY

An exemption policy must be evolutionary rather than static. The
history of the application of laws exempting specific items of property
illustrates the inflexibility of such an approach. Constantly changing
needs preclude the use of a permanent roster of exempted items.46
The best solution seems to be an exemption based on a single
medium-cash.4 7 Cash amounts could be updated by using consumer
or market indices4s incorporated by reference into the exemption
statutes. This would assure that the amount of the cash exemption
would be automatically revised to reflect current purchasing power.
The base amount of the cash exemption should rationally reflect the
personal needs of the bankrupt debtor and his dependents. Evaluation
of those needs demonstrates the desirability of two distinct exemptions.
The first should provide a subsistence allowance for the support of the
bankrupt and his dependents during the proceedings. Both the Bankruptcy Act of 180049 and the British Bankruptcy Act5° contain provisions for a similar allowance. The second exemption should provide a
rehabilitation allowance sufficient to enable the bankrupt to rejoin
society as a productive member. Cutting corners here may utterly defeat rehabilitation; 1 there is no social sense in returning a three-legged
horse to the race.
Since no truly typical bankrupt exists, a separate determination of
the twofold exemption allowance must be made for each of three
discernible classes of bankrupts. The first class consists of wage earners,
who have filed over eighty percent of the voluntary bankruptcy peti46 Laws exempting general "classes" of property would probably invite conflicting
interpretations, thereby compromising national uniformity. Moreover, just as the drafters
of the horse and buggy exemptions did not foresee the Model-T and its progeny, legislators
today may not foresee tomorrow's "necessities" well enough to cover them with a "class."
47 Comment, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALE L.J. 1459,
1507 (1959).
48 See, e.g., BuREAu o THE CENsus, supra note 26, at 855, table 504 (1967).
49 Act of April 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 53, 2 Stat. 84.
50 Bankruptcy Act of 1914, 4 &5 Geo. 5, c. 59, § 58.
51 The present law provides that no person may seek a discharge in bankruptcy if he
has received a discharge within the previous six years. Bankruptcy Act § 14(c)(5), 11 U.S.C.
§ 32(c)(5) (1964). Such a "sink or swim" proposal does not solve the problem of rehabilitation, but rather merely prevents recidivism, a goal of dubious value. This policy
seems to recognize a basic fault in the rehabilitative nature of the present bankruptcyexemption system: the chance for rehabilitation afforded by the present Bankruptcy Act
is too uncertain to allow multiple consecutive discharges in bankruptcy.
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tions in recent years. 52 The second class consists of self-employed proprietors and professionals, who share the unique rehabilitative need of
business and professional re-establishment. The last class is comprised of
the bankrupt without assets, who cannot benefit from any exemption
out of his estate5 3
A. The Wage Earner and ChapterXIII
Wage earners, representing by far the most numerous of personal
bankrupts, should be encouraged to find relief outside of bankruptcy
where feasible. This policy has been embQdied in Chapter XIII of the
Bankruptcy Act, 54 which works on the same assumption as that which
motivates the consumer creditor; that the wage earner's chief asset is
his wage potential. 55 Chapter XIII is not strictly a bankruptcy provision; it entails the formulation of plans by which the debtor may be
relieved from the "psychic burden" of his debts while paying them
gradually out of his income.56 In essence, it provides an extension of
time, up to three years 57 over which the debtor may apply his income
in excess of sustenance requirements to the payment of his debts. Cred52 There were 208,243 bankruptcies in fiscal year 1967, of which 191,709 were
voluntary nonbusiness individual bankruptcies. Over 80% of these individuals were
empolyed both prior to and at the time of bankruptcy. Research Serv. Div., supra note 2,
at 1-2; see R. DOLPHIN, AN ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC AND PERSONAL FACTORS LEADING TO

CONSUMER
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57-61 (1965). Since fewer than 1% of the individual bankruptcy

filings are involuntary, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, BANKRUPTCY
STATISTICS 5 (1906) [hereinafter cited as BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS], all pptition filed by
individuals in 1967 numbered approximately 194,000.
53 Most bankruptcy filings by individuals involve assetless estates, which cannot
contribute significantly to the discharge of creditors' claims. In fiscal year 1965, there were
108,134 no-asset cases out of 149,820 voluntary straight bankruptcy fi.ings. The average
realization from these cases was only $109. BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, supra note 52, at 5, 8.
It appears, however, that this realization was computed after the exemptions of the
bankrupt had been taken from the estate.
54 52 Stat. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-86 (1964).
55 R. DOLPMN, supra note 52, at 96.
56 Bankruptcy Act § 623, 11 U.S.C. § 1023 (1964). Since this is not a bankruptcy provision, several states have enacted wage-earner relief plans. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 27A.5301 (Rev. vol. 1962); Shanker, Comparison of Ch. XIII Proceedingsand State Wage
Earner Relief Plans, 19 PERSONAL FIN. L.Q. 153 (1965).
Psychic burden arises from the number of creditors and collection tactics used. 'Tactics
commonly used include threatening calls to their wives while they were at work, calls late at
night, calls and letters to the employer, and sometimes visits to the employer." R. DOLPHIN,
supra notp 5R, at 67. The larger the number of creditors, the more likely it is that the
bankrupt will be subjected to such tactics. Creditors of the typical bankrupt number
between 16 and 20. Address by Suzanne Matsen to the American Home Economics Ass'n
Nat'l Workshop of Consumer Credit in Family Financial Management, at Madison, Wisc.,

Oct. 10, 1907, at 3 [hereinafter cited as Matsen].
Sr Bankruptcy Act § 661, 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1964).
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itors should favor a Chaptet XIII plan over bankruptcy, since they
recover a far greater proportion of the credit they have extended. 8
Where it appears that the debt of the Chapter XIII petitioner is too
great to be satisfied from wage paybients within three yeats, the debtor
may enter into a composition plan, combining debt extension with
dischatge. Under such a plan, the debtor pays as much as he can froi
his wages over the three years. At the end of the period, he is discharged
from the balance of his debts, and forfeits none of his assets.
Although Chapter XIII appears fat more favorable to both treditors and debtors than straight bankriptcy, it is not widely used. Although all wage earzners theoretically are eligible for a Chapter XIII
extension or composition, only seventeen percent entered such plans
in fiscal year 1967.69 Several reasons may be offered for the wage earner's
failure to take advantage of Chapter XIII, including ignotance of the
possibility of an extension or composition, poor counselling, 60 moral
irresponsibility and lack of desire to pay creditors to avoid the stigma
of bankruptcy, 61- and inability to qualify for an ektension ot to structure an adequate composition plan. Fufthefmiiore, although Chapter
XIII proceedings are voluntary and the debtor may withdraw at any
time to seek discharge in straight bankruptcy, the move into Chapter
XIII is not his choice alone. The debtor's petition for an extension or
composition can be blocked by a majoriy of unsecured creditors or
62
by any secured creditor.
Greater use of Chapter XIII proceedings would reduce exemption
problems. But since the "stigma" of bankruptcy seemingly does little
to encourage use of Chapter XIII, the problem is to make extension
and composition plans more attractive to both creditors and debtors.
It has been suggested that a small cash exemption in bankruptcy
58 The statistics are impressive. Of the 18,513 asset cases of bankruptcy determined in
1965, $67,290,022 were paid to creditors whose claims totalled $410,710,957. BANKRUPTCY
STATSTICS, supra note 52, table F-6 (1969). Of the 127,142 nominal- and no-asset cases,
$2,197,452 were applied to $293,088,858 worth of claims. Id. table F-9. On the other
hand, in 9,660 Chapter XIII arrangements debtors managed to pay off $16,206,660 towards
claims worth $16,905,370--dose to total recovery. Id. table F-8.
59 Research Serv. Div., supra note 2, table III, at 5.
60 R. DoLPvMN, supra note 52, at 27,
61 There are some debts bankrupts feel less compulsion to pay than others. Deficiency
judgments, for example, arise where the Value of the repbssessed security is not sufficient
to offset the credit balance outstanding on the loan dt the time of the repossessi6n. These
deficiency debts are regarded with patticular hostility. Most debtors Cannot see Why they
should have to pay for an item that no longer benefits them. G, BAUNNFR, supra note 2,
at 13; R.,DoLPHN, supra note 52, at 105-07.
62 Bankruptcy Act § 652, 11 U.S.C. § 1052 (1964).
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would force more wage earilers into Chapter XIII. 63 Unless restricted
to wage earners, however, the low exemption would be unfair, since
the choice of relief for bankrupts other than wage earners is limited to
straight bankruptcy. It has also been suggested that bankruptcy should
not be available to persons whose total debt is below a statutory minimum.6 4 The intended effect would be to reduce the number of voluntary petitions filed. The theory is somewhat problematic, since a minimum debt requirement might encourage debtors to delay seeking
relief in order to build up the requisite minimum debt. The result
might be a further dissipation of assets rather than increased use of
Chapter XIII. Another approach is to deny bankruptcy discharge as a
statutory privilege to those wage earners capable of carrying out a successful extension or composition. 65 The best solution for encouraging
use of Chapter XIII would seem to be to reduce the percentage of
creditors, both secured and unsecured, needed for a Chapter XIII
plan. In all probability, this would increase debtors' use of the plans
and would result in satisfaction of a greater proportion of their debts.66
Increased use of Chapter XIII would yield no real prejudice to
creditors since they fare much worse in a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding. Secured creditors would retain their preferential position and
would either be paid first or would have a high percentage of the income diverted to satisfy their claims.6 7 By making Chapter XIII more
attractive and more accessible, nonbankruptcy relief could be obtained
by more wage-earning debtors. 68 When a wage earner cannot success63

Comment, supra note 47, at 1509.

64 G. BRUNNER,
65 R. DOLPHIN,

supra note 2, at 54.
supra note 52, at 112.

66 See note 58 supra.
67 Under the present Chapter XIII system, all secured creditors must assent to the
wage-earner's plan. Bankruptcy Act §§ 651, 652, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1052 (1964). Approval of
the plan binds all the creditors, including the non-assenting unsecured creditors. Bankruptcy Act § 657, 11 U.S.C. § 1057 (1964). Reducing the number of secured creditors needed
to approve a plan would necessitate such a bribe to prevent foreclosure unless all of the
non-assenting secured creditors are to be bound.
68 Matsen, supra note 56, at 8, indicates that the petitioners in bankruptcy had a
median income of between $4,000 and $5,000 per year and a total debt of about $4,800.
More optimistic figures indicate a considerably lower median debt. G. BRUNNER, supra
note 2, at 53 (under $3,000 in Ohio); R. DorPHN, supra note 52, at 63 ($3,184 in Michigan).
Brunner's figures suggest even more encouraging results than above: "The average bankrupt with income of $6,500 had debt, of all kinds, of only $3,640." G. BRUNNER, supra
note 2, at 91. Spreading debt over three years would leave the debtor with an income
of $5,300 per year. Brunner asserts that debtors with incomes of $3,000 or more (70%
of the cases) had debts amounting to 55% to 68% of yearly income. Id. Under a three-year
plan, these wage earners could recover between 75% and 80% of their wages while paying
their debts in full.
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fully complete a Chapter XIII program, however, other avenues of
relief must be made available to him. Thus, the determination of a
cash exemption allowance must be made for those wage earners who
still find it necessary to pursue straight bankruptcy.
B. Valuation of a Subsistence Allowance for Bankrupts
In Great Britain, the bankruptcy trustee "may from time to time
such allowance as he may think just to the bankrupt out of
his property for the support of the bankrupt and his family ...."69
Sustenance and rehabilitation are recognized as separate goals that require separate exemptions. Our Bankruptcy Act, on the other hand,
makes no provision for the bankrupt's support during proceedings,
apart from those state wage exemptions incorporated by section 6 of
the Act. The original Bankruptcy Act of 1800 did provide for such an
allowance, 70 but it was not revived in the Act of 1841 and has not returned since. A sustenance allowance is desirable from at least two
standpoints: it preserves the rehabilitative exemption for its intended
post-bankruptcy purpose, and it provides family security during the
adjudicatory process.
Two quantitative components are needed to calculate a subsistence
allowance: the duration of the bankruptcy proceedings, and the per
diem dollar amount necessary to insure adequate support. In the interest of uniformity, a maximum time for completion of bankruptcy
proceedings, and thus for duration of the subsistence allowance, must
be prescribed. The Bankruptcy Act presently provides that property
interests obtained by bequest, devise, or inheritance, and an interest
by the entireties that becomes transferable by the bankrupt, shall be
vested in the trustee only if obtained within six months after bankruptcy adjudication. 71 Although the six-month limit appears to be
arbitrary, it reflects a legislative determination that the bankrupt's
property should not be encumbered by the proceedings for longer than
six months. This same six months seems to represent a reasonable maximum time for the duration of the subsistence allowance.
In all cases, however, it is especially in the interest of creditors to
insure that the estate is closed and the bankrupt discharged as soon as
possible, since the allowance is cut off and more of the estate is preserved for the creditors. It seems, therefore, that on a vote of creditors
at their meeting, the bankrupt could be presented for summary dis...make

69 Bankruptcy Act of 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59, § 58.
70 Act of April 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 53, 2 Stat. 34.
71 Bankruptcy Act § 70(a)(7), 11 U.S.C. § l10(a)(7) (1964).
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charge, under certain conditions. Adjustments between the estate, now
severed from the bankrupt, and the creditors could then be made as
soon as fair notice requirements permit. One such condition of
summary discharge could be the existence of no, or nominal, assets.
In the assetless or nominal asset estate, the time for administration can
be cut down drastically. In such cases, the office of trustee is often bypassed under the current law72 This procedure indicates the interest
of the bankruptcy courts in streamlining proceedings in situations
where a laborious administration would be unprofitable to all concerned. Streamlining practices ought to be encouraged and extended.
In addition to summary discharge concurred in by the creditors
the bankruptcy court could grant a pro forma discharge immediately,
eliminating the subsistence allowance. Such a proceeding might permit
a maximum saving to creditors, while enabling the debtor immediately
to begin re-establishing himself. Assets received after the discharge
would not be subject to further claims by his bankrupt estate. This
procedure could be applied where the estate is sufficiently assetless so
that the creditors probably would not be prejudiced. The estate could
always be reopened in the event a creditor objected after receiving
notice of the discharge. A charge of fraud would be sufficient ground
to cause a withdrawal of the discharge. In such a case, the bankrupt's
sustenance allowance would be reinstated from the withdrawal until
up to six months after his initial adjudication. Giving the reins to creditors on this point may encourage cheaper, more efficient proceedings.
The dollar amount per day should be tied to official indices that
will enable the allowance to retain its purchasing power. A recent
study of bankruptcy indicates the minimum subsistence requirements
for families of various sizes. Figures were developed for both "adequate" and "comfortable" living.37 The data show that the bankrupt
with a wife and two children would require 1,380 dollars for "ade72

General Orders in Bankruptcy, order 15, 11 U.S.C. Appendix, promulgated pur-

suant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1964).
73 The following were cited as minimum incomes necessary after taxes for maintenance:
Adequate

$1270

Comfortable

1 person

$1652

1799
2312

2 persons
3 persons

2344
3013

2763

4 persons

3600

3171
3553
4118

5 persons
6 persons
7 or more persons

4133
4630
5364

R. DOLPMN, supra note 52, at 98.
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quate" living through a six-month period. Tables developed for various
locales could become a permanent part of the exemption structure.
Variations should also exist for the different classes of bankrupts.
To account for the wages of the bankruptcy-electing wage earner, each
item of income received within six months of adjudication should
automatically become part of the estate, as would be true under the
Chapter XIII plan.7 A subsistence allowance would be returned to
the bankrupt from each paycheck, and any excess would be retained
for the benefit of creditors. For the professional or self-employed bankrupt with no income, the exemption would be funded by sale of the
assets comprising the bankrupt estate. As with existing exemptions,
the assetdess bankrupt would not benefit from a cash exemption for
subsistence. The exemptions would merely allow the bankrupt to retain a portion of his existing assets, and would not provide a new fund
for his benefit. 5
Administering a subsistence allowance may prove difficult, since
the needs of statistically similar bankrupts may differ to such an extent
that the amount exempted becomes a float to one and a millstone to
another. Yet, even a fairly rigid system based on comprehensive tables
that attempt, at least, to take account of varying circumstances, seems
more capable of uniform application than the discretionary British
dole system, which would tend to collect the barnacles of case law.
C. Valuation of a RehabilitativeAllowance for Bankrupts
In order to sustain the advantage afforded by a discharge in bankruptcy, the law should provide an exemption of sufficient material inventory to facilitate the bankrupt's economic rehabilitation. State statutes exempting homestead and other itemized properties are founded
on myriad determinations of the standard of necessity. Uniformity
demands that valuation of a cash allowance for rehabilitation be based
on a single standard of necessity that reflects the interests of both the
bankrupt and his creditors.
To determine a plausible rehabilitative allowance, the rosters of
exempt items in current state statutes7 6 and home inventories should be
74 Bankruptcy Act § 611, 11 U.S.C. § 1011 (1964).
75 The case of the indigent bankrupt presents a problem insoluble by exemption laws.

The solution is to find a subsistence income source for the indigent bankrupt. Referral to
local welfare agencies is the most obvious answer. With current social legislation for the
poor, a federal program of relief coupled with occupational rehabilitation or "temporary
employment" programs could be utilized. This therapeutic alternative is the most feasible
one for the unemployed, assetless bankrupt who had refrained from seeking bankruptcy
relief.
76 Despite the clear disadvantages of a roster-type statute, the items contained therein
do have a rehabilitative flavor, and have not been included wholly without reason.
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consulted 7 Although existing data on home and personal inventories
do not represent minimum necessities, two studies do provide sufficient
information to permit the approximation of a replacement cost valuation for such minimum inventories.7 8 The following rehabilitative
allowances can be justified: 2,200 dollars for an unmarried bankrupt,
and 3,900 dollars for the typical bankrupt, who is married with two
children.7 9
The proposed exemption makes no allowance for a homestead,
as traditionally provided for by many state statutes. The reasons are
that homestead exemptions are inappropriate in light of current housing patterns and that the sustenance allowance makes some provision
for shelter.
The first reason is by far the more impelling rationale for eliminating homesteads from an exemption scheme. With the exception of
California and Texas, no state currently exempts a homestead of sufficient value to qualify as a habitable dwelling in urban and suburban
areas, where typical bankrupts reside. To exempt a homestead of reasonable usefulness, an allowance of ten thousand dollars or more would
have to be made. This is a rather large amount to withhold from creditors. Because of the wide range of climates and building costs nationally, great variations would inevitably arise in the actual housing exemption. It is patently absurd to include in a statute an architect's
conception of the prototypical bankruptcy bungalow as an alternative to value fixing.
Moreover, since most bankrupts are fairly young,8 0 those who own
their homes are liable to have them heavily mortgaged. The mortgagee's security interest in the home renders the exemption nugatory
on foreclosure. The bankrupt is left with his equity, not a house. Fi77 A typical household inventory includes kitchen appliances, utensils, household
textiles, and furniture. Apparel and jewelry are usually segregated as personal inventory
items. Both household and personal assets should be accounted for in determining a
single cash exemption.
78 Wells, Finandal Management Practices of Young Families (unpublished thesis
in Cornell University Library 1958); Stein, Ithaca [N.Y.] Families and Their Inventories, A Pilot Study of Inventories of Household Goods Other than Wearing Apparel
(unpublished thesis in Cornell University Library 1965).
79 The exemption allowances were developed from data provided by the two studies.
The inventory groups (heavy appliances, small appliances, furniture, household textilessheets, towels, etc., and various utensil groups) were summed. Certain items needed no
duplication for the married bankrupt. For married bankrupts, approximately $1,000 was
added to the single bankrupt's allowance. A large portion of this was a clothing allowance
of $500. Approximately $350 per child was added to the allowance based on considerations
of furniture and clothing.
80 R. DOLPHIN, supra note 52, at 48-49; Matsen, supra note 56, at 3.
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nally, many bankrupts are urban renters. Exemption of a homestead
will not affect them, since they have no homestead to exempt. The
subsistence allowance would provide for shelter by including rent for
the bankrupt for the period of the adjudication proceedings.
D. The Buy-Back Scheme
When contrasted with the average value of exemptions presently
claimed ($943),81 the suggested figures ($2,200 and $3,900) appear high.

The discrepancy results from assigning a replacement cost valuation
to the inventories. Since it would be unjust to force creditors to reequip the bankrupt with new goods, the bankrupt should be compelled
to apply part of his exemption to "buy back" essential items of his own
household equipment, apparel, and other goods. The repurchase
scheme would entail the use of replacement costs, but only in the sense
that such an amount would be deducted from the bankrupt's exemption
for each item repurchased. The trustee8 2 would oversee the bankrupt
to insure responsible use of the exemption, making sure that the bankrupt does not elect to take cash when he might reasonably purchase
items from the estate that would be useful in his rehabilitation. Vesting discretion in the trustee would assure the creditor that the bankrupt cannot simply elect his exemption in cash and leave his used
household goods in the estate. It would also assure society that the
bankrupt is using his allowance for its intended purpose-rehabilitation.
Some examples should clarify the operation of a buy-back scheme.
Suppose bankrupt A owns a living room suite that would cost five
hundred dollars to replace with comparable furnishings. Under the
proposed plan, he may apply five hundred dollars of his exemption
allowance to repurchase these furnishings. As a result he would keep
his own furniture and release five hundred dollars to the bankrupt
estate for the benefit of his creditors. He could, however, elect to redeem other items in his estate. The guiding hand of the trustee would
approve the selection of the goods to be retrieved from the estate, and
81 Comment, supra note 47, at 1505.
82 Under the proposed plan, the office of the trustee would involve considerably
different duties and powers from those he currently exerts. Even under the present law,
however, the trustee may select for the bankrupt property to be exempted for his

benefit, where the exemption statute calls for items to a specified dollar amount and the
bankrupt has claimed this amount but has not itemized the property he wishes to keep.
In re Lippow, 92 F.2d 619, 620 (7th Cir. 1937). Since far broader discretionary powers would
be called for in the successful operation of the buy-back scheme, the current practice of
electing the trustee in a creditors' meeting would not be appropriate. The referee would
have to appoint a trustee sufficiently knowledgeable in such matters.
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would prevent the bankrupt from using the exemption allowance to
buy new goods duplicating those in the estate. The selection process
would continue until the exemption has been completely used by the
bankrupt. Since in the typical situation there are few, if any, assets that
could readily be liquidated to give the bankrupt actual cash to finance
his repurchases, dealings between the exemption fund and the estate
would exist only on paper. A situation may arise, however, where there
are no items to be retrieved, or where those available for repurchase
would in no way facilitate rehabilitation or enhance family security.
Here actual cash obtained from liquidation of assets would be turned
over to the bankrupt in the amount of the exemption. If the bankrupt
is assetless, and the exemption cannot be funded by sale of assets, he
must seek relief as a pauper.8 3 Where the bankrupt has fraudulently
conveyed his repurchasable items, suitable fines could be levied against
his cash exemption.
Suppose bankrupt B's living room suite would cost five thousand
dollars to replace. Applying his entire exemption would retrieve a mere
fraction of these furnishings and would leave him nothing for other necessities. He should therefore forfeit his furniture and use the cash from
his exemption to purchase a more modest suite comparable to bankrupt
A's. The estate benefits from the sale value of the five thousand dollar
suite, less any portion of cash from the liquidation applied against the
cash exemption should B elect to purchase goods outside the estate.
Such a buy-back system would be flexible enough to accommodate
creditors in high-, low-, and no-inventory situations by mitigating the
replacement cost valuation for the exemption. Allowing the trustee
discretionary powers over the bankrupt's repurchase selections would
overcome the improvident bankrupt's fruitless dissipation of a straight
cash exemption.
E. Additional Allowances
Special consideration should be given to the professional and the
self-employed bankrupt. In addition to the standard household exemption enjoyed by other bankrupts, an extra allowance should be made
if the bankrupt shows an intent to return to his former occupation.
The bankrupt professional or tradesman will need his library, equipment, or tools of the trade. Existing statutes generally favor such exemptions with fairly generous allowances. 84 To bring into balance the
creditor-debtor conflict in this area, a maximum allowance should be
83 See note 75 supra.

84 See note 31 supra.
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established in accordance with the nature of the individual's trade or
profession and the equipment needed to maintain a minimal competency in his field. Again the policy of the Bankruptcy Act is not
served by returning a person to the business or profession on an
economic crutch. Unfortunately, equipment costs vary widely for
different trades and professions. An allowance sufficient to fully equip
the mechanic might not purchase a dentist's chair. Several formulations
of the exemptions may be necessary to take account of these diversities.
However, a single liberal allowance with a buy-back operation similar
to that proposed for the general rehabilitation exemption seems more
consonant with uniformity and simplicity.85 Thus, the exemption might
allow one man to buy back his tools fully, while permitting another to
rent them or make a down payment on new tools.
IV
ENACTMENT OF A MODERN EXEMPTION POLICY

Although enactment of a uniform cash exemption seems to be the
best solution to the exemption problem, the question of who should
enact the requisite legislation remains. There are two alternatives: enactment by the states of a uniform exemption law, and federal preemption by amendment of Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act.
A. Retention of Control by the States
A uniform law for the states would probably provide an exemption
the value of which would be between the high and the low values in
current statutes. Creditors in states with low exemptions would probably oppose such a law, although provisions for easing Chapter XIII
requirements and requiring a minimum debt for a voluntary filing
may somewhat reverse this tendency.86 In high exemption states,
creditors would be likely to favor the lower exemption in a uniform
act. Adoption of a uniform act probably would be resisted strenuously
by special interest groups anxious to retain itemized exemptions, by an
improvised debtor's lobby, and by simple inertia.
Since state revision of exemption laws has been laggard, a uniform
proposal on exemptions probably would not receive widespread ac§§ 5205(a)(7), 5205(b)(4) (McKinney 1963).
86 Over a six-year period, $3.7% of the voluntary bankruptcies in Ohio would have
been "avoided" under a $2,000 minimum debt requirement. G. BRUNNER, supra note 2, at
85 E.g., N.Y. Cry. PRAc. LAW
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ceptance. Adoption by only some of the states would not achieve the
goal of a comprehensive, uniform exemption policy.
B. Federal Preemption
At least one court has noted that it is within the power of Congress
to exclude state exemptions altogether.8 7 Such a policy is not wholly
without precedent. The Bankruptcy Acts of 1800 and 1841 utilized
preemption to achieve uniformity. In 1867 Congress compromised the
preemption approach by allowing both a minimum federal exemption 88
and a state exemption. Since it does not appear that state legislatures can
realistically be expected to adopt uniform legislation, return to a federal exemption seems to be the best path to the desired result. 89
A strong argument for federal control is the federal nature of the
bankruptcy problem itself. The volume of filings and the increasingly
national character of credit90 gives the exemption problem a distinctly
national character. The lack of uniform economies within the states
themselves indicates the need for a national solution. Chicago and
Manhattan, although separated by nearly half a continent, have a
greater economic affinity than Manhattan and rural Chenango County,
both presently subject to the same New York State exemption law.
V
SUMMARY OF PROPOSED CHANGES

Federal exemption policy should (1) facilitate the use of Chapter
XIII proceedings, and thereby diminish the frequency of petitions in
bankruptcy, and (2) provide a federal exemption in Section 6 of the
Bankruptcy Act, preempting state exemption laws.
Chapter XIII should be made more accessible and attractive to the
wage earner. Eliminating the veto power of each secured creditor by
requiring only majority approval of the plan would enhance the availability of Chapter XIII proceedings. Denying bankruptcy discharge to
87 Novak v. O'Neal, 201 F.2d 227, 231 n.4 (5th Cir. 1953).
88 Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 14, 14 Stat. 522.
89 Comment, supra note 47, at 1508-09. It would not be particularly difficult for
Congress to finance research necessary for exemption reform. For example, the fund
collected by the Referees in Bankruptcy has accumulated over $10 million and could
be used to finance such research. BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, supra note 52, Letter of Trans-

mittal (1965).
90 Use of credit cards of national corporations by consumers points up this recent
phenomenon. In 1966, for example, 168,000 gasoline credit cards were used in nearly 40%
of the households in the Milwaukee, Wisconsin, area. Eisendrath, supra note 1, at 2.
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those wage earners eligible for Chapter XIII proceedings would also
encourage the use of the Chapter XIII alternative.
A federal exemption substituted for state exemptions should be
measured in cash and tied to economic indices to prevent obsolescence.
The exemption should be twofold: a subsistence allowance and a
rehabilitative allowance. The subsistence allowance should be granted
for a limited time only, which time might be shortened by creditors
seeking a summary discharge for the bankrupt or otherwise hastening
bankruptcy procedures. Both exemptions should be valued to comprehend various bankrupts and their dependents, and allowances should be
enacted in tabular form as an appendix to section 6. The federal
exemption should eliminate the homestead exemption as such and
provide for adequate shelter in the subsistence allowance. It should also
make provision for special professional and tradesman allowances to
enable such bankrupts to return to their former occupations with ample
opportunity to succeed.
Far broader discretionary powers should be granted to both the
referee and the trustee. The referee should be given the power to
effect summary discharges in asset cases on agreement of the creditors,
and in low-asset cases on his own motion, with adequate safeguards
to protect the creditors by allowing them to reopen the estate after
a post-discharge hearing. Added to the office of trustee should be discretionary powers to oversee the use of the rehabilitative exemption. Use
of the buy-back scheme would protect creditors and help assure the
bankrupt's rehabilitation. In exceptional cases, where the sustenance
allowance is abused, his power should extend to managing the bankrupt
until the end of proceedings.
Raymond C. Marier

